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Gorbachev's Disarmament Proposals Analyzed
HK0408055088 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 31, 1 Aug 88, p 29

[Article by Zhao Youlin (6392 2589 2651) and Mao Zhixin (5403 1807 2450): "Gorbachev's New Proposal on European Disarmament"]

[Text] During his visit to Poland, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Gorbachev put forward a new proposal on European disarmament on 11 July: First, if NATO agrees to stop deploying 72 F-16 fighter-bombers in northern Italy, the Soviet Union will also withdraw similar planes from bases in Eastern Europe. Second, a European center for reducing the danger of war can be set up, and this center can be used as a place for cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Third, a meeting of leaders from all European countries can be held to discuss ways to break the deadlock in reducing conventional armaments. At the same time, Gorbachev again put forward the three-step program for reducing the conventional forces and armaments in Europe. Its main points are as follows: The two sides first verify the imbalance and differences in their forces and armaments in various military branches, then both the Warsaw Pact and NATO reduce their troops by 500,000 and maintain this tendency so as to really make their armed forces defensive in character. He also stressed that the reduction in conventional armaments should be linked with the reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.

The above proposal was part of the new detente offensive staged by the Soviet Union toward the West. In order to create a stable international environment that is favorable to the Soviet Union's domestic development, since he took office, Gorbachev has put forward more than 40 proposals on nuclear and conventional disarmament. Over the past 2 years, the Warsaw Pact and NATO have held many meetings to discuss conventional disarmament in Europe. Although the two sides moved their positions closer, some major differences remain unsolved. The main differences include the following points: First, the form of negotiations. The Warsaw Pact holds that all the 35 member countries of the European Security and Cooperation Conference should participate in the negotiations; but NATO holds that the negotiations should be carried out between the two military blocs. Second, the target of the negotiations. The Warsaw Pact holds that the conventional armaments in Europe should be stabilized through substantial reductions; but NATO holds that a balance of strength in conventional armaments should be restored with arms reduction being made on the side with more armaments. Third, the scope of disarmament. The Warsaw Pact insists that the reduction in conventional armaments be linked with the reduction in tactical nuclear weapons; but NATO rejected this. The Warsaw Pact holds that the geographical scope of conventional disarmament should extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, including the islands close to the European continent; but NATO also opposed this. In his latest disarmament

proposal, Gorbachev admitted the imbalance in the military strength between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but he did not change his position on the issues concerning the form and target of the negotiations and the scope of disarmament.

According to the analyses and comments made by various parties concerned, Gorbachev put forward his new proposal by proceeding from the following considerations: First, he tried to make use of the United States' difficulty in maintaining its military bases in Western Europe to force it to reduce the American forces stationed in Europe. In recent years, the contradiction between the United States and its European allies was getting sharper. In particular, the desire of the people in Western Europe for peace has forced some governments to reconsider their military relations with the United States. Now, the United States is facing many difficulties in maintaining and using its military bases in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Recently, the Spanish Government did not allow the United States to continue to deploy F-16 fighter-bombers in its territory, so the United States had to negotiate with Italy about shifting the warplanes from Spain to Italy. In these circumstances, Gorbachev promised that if NATO agrees to give up the plan to deploy the 72 F-16 fighter-bombers in Italy, the Soviet Union will also withdraw similar planes from Eastern Europe. Obviously, he tried to take advantage of the United States' difficulties in finding air force bases to force it to reduce its air force in Europe. Second, he tried to take Soviet-U.S. relations as an example to promote the all-round detente in East-West relations. After he took office, Gorbachev gave priority in his foreign policy to adjust Soviet-U.S. relations, which were indeed somewhat improved through his four meetings with Reagan. This time, his proposal was aimed at mitigating the East-West military confrontation in Europe and promoting all-round detente in Europe. Third, he tried to make use of the favorable opportunity after the signing of the INF Treaty to promote conventional disarmament in Europe. After the signing of the INF Treaty, although the United States gave various promises and guarantees to Western Europe for its defense, the West European countries were still worried that once a war breaks out in Europe, they will have to face the threats of the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. So Gorbachev made use of the fears of the West European countries to force the United States to make concessions.

Gorbachev's proposal attracted wide attention from world opinion. Different reactions have been made by Eastern and Western countries from their respective security interests. The GDR held that it was a "timely" proposal which would help increase trust and security in Europe, and it indicated that it had strong interest in the establishment of the European center for reducing the risks of war. Poland readily accepted this proposal and agreed that the European center be set up in Warsaw. Other East European countries also supported the proposal and expressed a rather positive attitude. The Warsaw Pact summit meeting between 15 and 16 July

called for NATO to hold talks with the Warsaw Pact this year to discuss conventional disarmament in Europe, but NATO did not respond to this call. The major countries in NATO held that Gorbachev's proposal was designed to sever relations between Western Europe and the United States, so it was "unacceptable." The reduction in warplanes will not help disarmament. FRG Chancellor Kohl even made a radio broadcast speech, warning that NATO must not place itself under "time pressure" because of the Soviet disarmament proposal. The United States also flatly rejected this proposal, saying that it was meaningless, because it just tried to squeeze the American military forces out of Europe so as to maintain Soviet military superiority in that region. The United States also pointed out that basic threats against security in Europe were caused by the superior conventional armaments of the Warsaw Pact. "Gorbachev's proposal tried to shift people's attention away from the ongoing disarmament talks in Vienna."

The Soviet Union and the United States have lacked mutual trust for a long time and their fundamental interests in Europe are antagonistic. In addition, the European conventional disarmament negotiations, which are multilateral talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, involve many complicated issues. Therefore, it is hard to expect that the European conventional disarmament talks will make any substantive breakthrough in the near future.

Carlucci Defends SDI During Soviet Tour
OW0308174988 Beijing XINHUA in English
1501 GMT 3 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow, August 3 (XINHUA)—U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci expressed objections to a lack of significant changes in the current Soviet military doctrine, while defending his own country's "Star Wars" plan, the Soviet Army daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) said today.

In a speech to the Voroshilov Military Academy Monday, his first day in the Soviet Union, Carlucci challenged the Kremlin to make public its military spending budget.

He told 200 of the Kremlin's top military brass that the United States was waiting to see whether Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new policies of "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (restructuring) would also be applied to the military.

Carlucci arrived here on Monday for a four-day official visit, the first by a U.S. defense secretary, as part of a series of military contacts between the two countries.

Carlucci and his Soviet counterpart Dmitriy Yazov, met for the first time in Bern, Switzerland, in March. Last month Soviet Chief of Staff Sergey Akhromeyev visited the United States.

Speaking to cadets and officers at the Soviet academy near Moscow only hours after his arrival, Carlucci said: "We have difficulty in reconciling a defensive doctrine with what we see in the structure of Soviet forces, and in an operational strategy emphasising the offensive, especially regarding elements of surprise and maneuver."

"We also have difficulty reconciling the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons with your continuing emphasis on heavy ICBM's such as the SS-18's," he said. He went on to describe Soviet armaments as having "a capability more compatible with a military doctrine that emphasizes pre-emptive nuclear strikes."

The defense secretary criticized the Kremlin for failing to make its military spending public, noting the Soviet Union spends between 15 and 17 percent of its gross national product on the military, compared to U.S. military expenditures of just 5.7 percent annually.

He also gave the cadets and officers a brief lecture about U.S. politics, democracy and freedom.

On the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars", Carlucci stressed that the system "is purely defensive and does not represent the slightest threat to the USSR."

He said the United States will continue to advance the "Star Wars" plan, and to talk, in Geneva, with the Soviet Union on cutting strategic arsenals by 50 percent.

In response to Carlucci's speech, Yazov and Akhromeyev reminded him that Washington should cut its naval forces. "It's impossible," the defense secretary replied, stressing that, in fact, the United States will have to "take steps" to strengthen its naval forces.

On the same day, Carlucci spent two hours in private talks with Yazov. He said on his arrival at the airport that he had not come for negotiations but for an exchange of views.

He told reporters at the end of the day that his talks with Yazov "went very well."

On Tuesday, Carlucci took a close-up look at the Air Force base and an Army motorized rifle division near Moscow, both of which until recently have been off limits to all foreigners.

The defense secretary, saying he was "very impressed," sat for about 15 minutes at the controls of a bomber while two other Blackjacks flew over the base at low altitude. The Blackjack, which greatly resembles the U.S. B-1 bomber, has a flight range of 7,200 kilometers, according to experts.

Carlucci left Moscow for the Crimea early today, and is expected to meet Soviet President Andrey Gromyko there. He is scheduled to leave the Soviet Union for Turkey on Thursday after calling on a ship of the Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol.

PLA Navy Develops Guided Missile Systems
HK0808041188 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese 5 Aug 88 p 4

[Report by Shen Shungen (3088 7311 2704): "The Chinese Navy Forms a Guided Missile-Based Attack Force"]

[Text] Data supplied by the equipment and technology department of the Chinese Navy shows that with many kinds of vessels equipped with all types and classes of guided missiles, the Chinese Navy is rapidly developing the use of more missiles. It has basically formed an attack force based on guided missiles. Along the 10,000-li coastline, the coast missile units are situated at various strategic points. Carrying various kinds of missiles, bomber groups patrol the airspace above the territorial sea. Fleet after fleet of guided missile vessels, escorts, and cruisers shuttle back and forth in the rolling seas and guided missile submarines cruise ceaselessly in the depths. The naval missile units are turning the motherland's coastal areas and territorial seas into a steel great wall.

Since the late 1950's the Chinese Navy has developed guided missiles by copying and constantly improving on Soviet missiles. The Navy has: Strengthened the missiles' electronic resistance capability and their capability to break through lines of defense at low altitude; set up China's overall research institute for coastal defense missiles; and developed a relatively complete range of production lines and test ranges. Meanwhile, the navy has also trained and developed operating and experimental units and equipped them with China's first anti-ship missile series.

In the early 1970's, China's development of naval missiles started to enter the stage of designing and blazing new trails on its own. It gradually evolved from an exclusively coastal defense system to a full range of missiles such as surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and submarine launched missiles, thereby developing its own missile defense system. In performance it has reached advanced world standards in many ways during the 1980's. Take as an example the anti-surface missiles which many countries call "China's Exocet." They can be carried by surface vessels and submarines and can also be mounted on aircraft or vehicles for mobile firing. They are sea-skimmers and can be fired in the multi-shot mode [shan mian fa she 2082 7240 3127 1410]. In complicated conditions they have a relatively strong capability of penetrating lines of defense and a fairly high accuracy rate. During many test firings they scored direct hits on the target.

To date the Chinese Navy not only has tactical missiles but also possesses strategic nuclear missiles. Since the submarine launching of strategic missiles in October 1982, qualitative changes have taken place in the Navy's weaponry and the modernization program has entered a new stage. While developing a new type of submarine-launched strategic missile, the Navy has also made new headway and breakthroughs in the operational use and technological functions of tactical missiles and is making the transition toward supersonic speed, ultra-low altitude, over-the-horizon capability [chao shi ju 6389 6018 6415], automation, and intelligence-fed accurate guidance [zhi neg hua jing que zhi dao 2535 5174 0553 4737 4292 0455 1418].

With the commissioning of more missiles the Navy has established advanced schools to train skilled personnel in guided missiles and offered special training classes for captains of missile equipped vessels, missile department heads, and so on. University graduates from these schools are being sent in an endless stream to various missile units, and to research departments and leading organs at all levels.

INTRABLOC

U.S. INF Inspectors Conclude Activities

End of CSSR Inspections

*LD2207162288 Prague CTK in English
1542 GMT 22 Jul 88*

[Text] Prague July 22 (CTK)—A group of ten U.S. experts ended today their first inspection of a former missile site on Czechoslovak territory in connection with the Soviet-U.S. treaty scrapping intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

After signing a report on the inspection in the area of Hranice near Prerov in Moravia, the group left with a Soviet and Czechoslovak escort for Prague.

Colonel Ivan Abrosimov, who headed the Soviet escort, told CTK that "Czechoslovakia completely fulfilled all commitments resulting for it from the adopted documents," i.e., the Czechoslovak-Soviet-GDR agreement on inspections under which Czechoslovakia was obliged to allow the inspectors to enter the country and to ensure transport and accommodation for them.

This morning, the U.S. inspectors checked several more former action stations and other installations which had been used until last March by a Soviet missile unit. The shorter-range SS 12 missiles have since been withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory and the installations are being converted to serve the needs of the Czechoslovak People's Army.

Head of the U.S. inspectors' group Lawrence G. Kelly told CTK that conditions had been prepared very carefully for the inspection. All four former action stations, including all parts constituting one installation covered by the agreement, were checked. He said that appropriate conclusions had been drawn but he was not authorized to make the results public. He noted that the group's activity was in complete harmony with the provisions of the treaty and voiced the conviction that the role of the inspection was fulfilled, also thanks to the effort of the Soviet and Czechoslovak sides.

Lawrence Kelly highly praised Czechoslovakia's role in ensuring the inspection and creating conditions for the work of the American group.

Colonel Jiri Dvorak of the Czechoslovak Defence Ministry, member of the Czechoslovak escort told CTK that "throughout the stay and inspection, members of the U.S. group acted correctly and fully in the spirit of the Soviet-U.S. treaty."

In the evening, the ten U.S. inspectors left Prague for Frankfurt by a Hercules 130 military aircraft. They were seen off at Ruzyně Airport by representatives of the Czechoslovak and Soviet foreign ministries and the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Soviet Army.

Departure From Leipzig

*LD2307181988 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1714 GMT 23 Jul 88*

[Text] Berlin, 23 Jul ADN—A group of U.S. inspectors today ended their work on GDR territory. They were seen off at Leipzig's Schkeuditz Airport by representatives of the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and the Moscow Center for the Reduction of the Nuclear Risk of the staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Since Friday the U.S. inspectors have been examining Soviet installations with SS-23 missiles near Weissenfels and Jena-Forst on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

As already reported, two U.S. groups inspected the former installations of Waren, Wokuhl, Bischofswerda and Koenigsbrueck from 18 to 20 July. SS-20 missiles had been stationed there until February 1988.

Warsaw Pact-NATO 'Mandate' Talks Take Break

*LD0308124688 Moscow TASS in English
1224 GMT 3 Aug 88*

[Text] Vienna August 3 TASS—The last meeting before the break has been held here within the framework of the consultations between the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries and NATO on drawing up a mandate for the talks on cuts in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In their speeches the members of the delegations summed up the results of the work done. Apart from such sections of the mandate, on which agreement was reached earlier, as the aim of the talks, control, exchange of information, agreements have been registered in recent weeks on the composition of the participants in the talks and the mandatory international character of the future agreements. Agreement has been practically reached on all the organizational issues and the procedure of holding talks.

A better understanding of the positions of the sides has been reached on the key element of the mandate—the subject of the talks, in particular the examination at them of dual purpose weapons. The sides have also discussed in detail questions concerning the determination of the geographical zone of the talks.

It has been agreed that after the three-week break consultations will resume late in August this year so as to complete earlier, if possible, the work on the mandate and start the talks already in the current year.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

First U.S. INF Inspectors in Moravian City

Arrive in Hranice

AU2507145588 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
22 Jul 88 pp 1, 2

[“MJ, ML”-signed report: “First Inspection in Hranice”]

[Text] Prague/Hranice na Morave (Our Correspondents)—A group of 10 American inspectors arrived by a Hercules C-130 transport plane at Ruzyně Airport on Thursday [21 July] morning, and on the same day carried out an inspection at the former missile base of Soviet OTR-22 (SS-22) nuclear missiles in Hranice na Morave. As is known, these missiles had already been withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory, and the American side requested the right to check this fact now.

The OTR-22 missiles are subject to the stipulations of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was signed on 7 December 1987. In addition to the signatory states, the USSR and the United States, the pledge to permit the verification of the fulfillment of the Washington treaty also concerns the territories of another seven states—the GDR, the CSSR, Italy, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain—where various types of these nuclear devices were stationed. The Soviet and the American side have the right to demand inspection on the territories of those states by announcing their intention prior to beginning their inspection to the government of the state in which they want to carry out the inspection. The duration of an inspection is 24 hours from the inspectors' entry into a military site, and can be extended by 8 hours if the side carrying out the inspection deems it necessary.

The commander of the group of American inspectors is Colonel Lawrence Kelly. The American inspectors were awaited at Ruzyně Airport by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of National Defense, and also by members of the Central Group of Soviet Forces. Col Kelly willingly answered questions put by the journalists present in his mother tongue—English—as well as in fluent Russian. He declared that his group will begin verification immediately after its arrival at the military site in Hranice na Morave, which was, as is known to the American side, the only place in the CSSR where Soviet nuclear missiles were stationed. He stressed that, until now, the entire inspection process, concerning a number of countries, has been without problems and difficulties; the American inspectors have been granted all the necessary conditions to fulfill their task. The United States has been informed that the Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory last February and March, that is, even before the ratification of the Soviet-American treaty.

The United States wants to check this, and his group brought the technical means it needs to do that. The American inspectors had a sketch of the former missile base in Hranice na Morave and they decided on their own which locations to check.

The American group began its inspection work in Hranice at 1500. CTK reported that the inspectors checked the Hranice military barracks, including the vehicle pool and the training area. They had the opportunity to inspect in detail individual buildings, which formerly served the Soviet missile unit, and places where there used to be equipment for the training of Soviet soldiers. They also made random checks on vehicles and further equipment belonging to the unit of the Czechoslovak People's Army which has taken over Hranice barracks after the departure of the Soviet detachment.

The inspectors then moved into the military area to one of the former combat positions. There they were able to convince themselves that all military materiel which is subject to elimination under the Soviet-American treaty was no longer there.

A total of 39 Soviet operational-tactical missiles used to be stationed in Hranice na Morave. As was already mentioned, they were taken from CSSR territory to the Soviet Union, where—again under American control—they will be eliminated. Groups of Soviet and American inspectors are already working on both USSR and U.S. territory. During their activity they have diplomatic status.

The first American inspection in Hranice will end on Friday [22 July].

Activities In Hanice Concluded

AU2507182488 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
23 Jul 88 p 1

[CTK report: “Inspection Activities in Hranice Concluded; L. G. Kelly: I Am Satisfied, Mission Fulfilled; American Representative Appreciates CSSR's Approach to Providing Conditions for the Activity and Work of Team Members”]

[Text] Hranice—This Friday [22 July] a team of 10 U.S. inspectors continued their first inspection on Czechoslovak territory in the area around Hranice, in the Prerov district; the inspection concerned the fulfillment of commitments issuing from the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

In the morning the American inspectors checked further former combat positions and other installations that were needed until March 1988 to provide for the combat readiness of a Soviet missile unit, armed with operational-tactical devices.

The facilities used by Soviet Army units prior to their departure from Hranice are currently being prepared for

complying with the Czechoslovak state norms, to serve the needs of the Czechoslovak People's Army.

In the afternoon, the American experts concluded their inspection activities in Hranice. After signing the inspection report, the American group and the accompanying Soviet and Czechoslovak escort departed for Prague.

In keeping with the CSSR-USSR-GDR Agreement on Inspections, it has been Czechoslovakia's duty as the country of deployment to permit and then to enable the side doing the checking to enter the country; to provide safe transportation to and from the place of entry in the CSSR; and to see to corresponding accommodation and catering for the inspectors and to the provision of telephone communication lines with the representative office in Prague. Colonel Ivan Abrosimov, head of the Soviet escort, told a CTK reporter in this connection: "The CSSR has totally fulfilled all the commitments for Czechoslovakia that follow from the adopted documents."

After the inspection in Hranice ended, Lawrence G. Kelly, head of the American group of inspectors, gave an interview to a CTK reporter; prior to leaving Prague by air, he gave an interview to a RUDE PRAVO reporter. He stated, among other things: "The conditions for our inspection have been most carefully prepared in every respect. We have checked all four of the former combat positions, including all their parts, which form a single installation covered by the treaty. We have drawn appropriate conclusions from the inspection. I am satisfied with the course of the inspection. However, I am not empowered to speak of the final results. But I can say that our activity was in complete harmony with the stipulations of the treaty. In my view, the mission of our inspection has been fulfilled—also thanks to the efforts of the Soviet and Czechoslovak sides." Inspector Kelly concluded the interview by expressing high appreciation for the CSSR's share in providing conditions for the inspection and for the work of the American team.

Colonel Jiri Dvorak, member of the Czechoslovak escort of the American group, stated that, throughout their stay in the country, the members of the American group acted correctly, and fully in the spirit of the Soviet-American treaty.

In the evening of the same day, the American inspectors left Prague by military aircraft for Frankfurt/Main.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Welcomes Disarmament Proposal, Threat to West Denied
AU2507175588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 23-24 Jul 88 p 2

[He. commentary: "What About the So-Called Large-Scale Offensive?"]

[Text] Great international attention is paid to the new initiatives of the Warsaw Pact member states. On Thurs-

day [21 July] Chancellor Kohl declared his government's readiness to react positively to this development. He welcomed the proposal made in Warsaw to start negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals before 1988. Shortly before that, Government Spokesman Ost had said that Bonn also wants to carefully examine above all the problem of eliminating imbalances in the armed forces and weapons of the two military alliances.

NATO has long clung to these asymmetries—by the way, they exist on both sides. The legend about a threat, the "concern" about a surprise attack by the East with a "large-scale offensive" have been repeatedly fed by allegations of the "stifling" conventional superiority of the East. In this way, the strategy of "deterrence," sticking particularly to tactical nuclear weapons, has been substantiated.

In the final analysis, however, this would make the path toward further disarmament steps more difficult, or even block it. Therefore it should be ended. For nobody threatens the West. Who or what exactly is to be "deterred"? What is the result of a careful examination of the declaration signed in Warsaw on the negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Eliminating the existing imbalances in the individual categories of conventional arms and armed forces on both sides would lead to equal and lower ceilings. After this target has been achieved, the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact states would be further reduced, that is, by approximately 500,000 men on each side. Finally—in a third stage—they should be reduced once again, that is, to an extent whereby they "do not suffice for a surprise attack and attack operations," as is literally stated in the Warsaw declaration.

In order to safeguard this not only before the end of the process, but from the beginning onward, strips or zones with a reduced arms level should be created along the meeting point of the two alliances. Moreover, all steps would be accompanied by coordinated measures for confidence-building. Data could be exchanged before the beginning of negotiations, precisely in order to ascertain imbalances, and these data could be examined by local inspections from the start of the negotiations onward.

And the tactical nuclear weapons? As is stressed in the Joint Declaration of the SED Central Committee Politburo, the GDR State Council, and the Council of Ministers of the GDR, the allied socialist states "emphatically call for the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the disarmament process in Europe. A quick solution of this problem would contribute to increasing security on the continent, and would considerably strengthen mutual trust in the 'European house.'"

With regard to the negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional arms, their very course, to say nothing of their results, would definitely render pointless the

allegations and "concerns" of NATO that were mentioned at the beginning. If there is a large-scale offensive, it is our new approach toward disarmament and peace, mutual trust and equal security.

Joint Troop Exercises With USSR Begin
*LD2407103688 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1007 GMT 24 Jul 88*

[Text] Berlin, 24 Jul (ADN)—The announced joint troop exercise of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and the GDR National People's Army began today. As planned, the participating troops of the two armies will be transferred to the Brandenburg, Luckenwalde, Eisenhuettenstadt, Peitz, Jessen, and Moeckern area and occupy the concentration regions as ordered.

The exercise, which is led by the general officer commanding an army of the GSFG, is being attended by up to 17,800 soldiers. The objective is to improve the state of training of the staffs and troops in the execution of defense actions.

According to the Stockholm Conference document, observers from all the CSCE member states have been invited. According to information to hand 40 representatives from 20 signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act are expected in the exercise zone Tuesday.

**FRG Skepticism of Disarmament Proposals
Rebuffed**
*AU2707105388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 25 Jul 88 p 2*

[“He.” commentary: “Still the Old Stuff?”]

[Text] Official Bonn—as we reported—has reacted positively to the Warsaw Pact’s new initiatives. At the same time, however, last Thursday [21 July] FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHEIN reported about strong opposing forces in an article entitled “The German NATO Leaders in Defensive Action. A Gloomy Picture of the ‘Enemy Situation’ Is To Dampen the Disarmament Euphoria.” This article states that precisely now, that is, after the publication of the Warsaw proposals, NATO Secretary General Woerner has submitted a paper, which was drawn up by FRG General Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, to the NATO partners. It teems with “threat factors,” “terrifying imbalances,” etc. The paper writes: “A trumpet call for rearmament, but not a word about the disarmament negotiations which are to eliminate precisely these imbalances.”

It can hardly be considered a coincidence either that DIE WELT immediately painted the “enemy situation” in glaring colors the day after the publication of the Warsaw proposals. All the old stuff about the “unchanged threat” posed by the “massive superiority of the Warsaw Pact” was conjured up. It is striking, elementary, grave, it is stated. The “danger of a surprise attack” is enormous.

And what about our proposal to eliminate this danger not only in the third stage of the 3-stage plan proposed in Warsaw, but from the beginning onward, by zones with a reduced arms level on both sides of the line of contact of the military alliances, that is, in a way that appears credible to the other side and can be verified by it? For the author of this article “the security situation of the FRG is evidently endangered” precisely by this, reducing the armed forces would “not lead to more security and less danger, but to more danger and less stability.”

Of course, this stupid stuff is carefully directed. Above all against those in the West who want disarmament instead of “deterrence” because they do not believe in the lie about the threat. That is, as can be learned from an analysis in last Friday’s [22 July] FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, the overwhelming majority of FRG citizens. Only 6 percent consider “deterrence” necessary. But 79 percent want all nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Europe.

It would be good if this were taken into account in politics. The “defensive action” of the “German NATO leaders” shows that the opponents of any kind of disarmament are increasing their activities. Thus it is all the more urgent that, with regard to disarmament, words are followed by deeds on both sides.

**NATO Skepticism of Pact Disarmament Schemes
Chided**
*AU2807095588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 27 Jul 88 p 2*

[“He.” commentary: “Only Confusion?”]

[Text] Following the new Warsaw Pact disarmament proposals a certain confusion is beginning to appear in NATO. NATO Secretary General Woerner, who has not even been in office for 14 days, set the tone without consulting the allies and before the texts had been translated and analyzed: “I am skeptical.”

The states of the alliance reacted more realistically. Their governments called the results of Warsaw a positive contribution to the disarmament discussion. Chancellor Kohl spoke of the positions of East and West coming closer together.

In contrast to this, NATO military circles in Brussels have not stopped concocting the old hostile images. No matter what is said about disarmament—the East’s superiority remains “overwhelming,” the danger of “aggression” with a “large-scale offensive” remains unchanged. NATO is helpless in the face of this threat, so to speak.

On the other hand, when asked how NATO is prepared for such a “threat,” Bundeswehr General von Sandratz, supreme commander of the Allied Forces in central

Europe, said: "We believe that things are not really so bad." The general even spoke of Western forces which, for their part, are "capable of an offensive."

But the Warsaw summit proposals are aimed precisely at reducing NATO and the Warsaw Pact conventional armed forces and arms between the Atlantic and the Urals to such an extent that on each side only the ability to defend itself remains and nobody can carry out a "large-scale offensive." The diabolical nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, too.

Is the confusion in NATO a result of the fact that the entire new direction does not suit some people there? Those who cling to the dream of military superiority and tend toward hazardous risks? Those who do not want to forgo the super profits that gush out of high armament? EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, a mouthpiece of those circles, wrote that the point is rather "arms shaping" than arms limitation. And: "The vision of a world without nuclear weapons becomes a nightmare, if we think realistically."

How will the responsible politicians of the West, who are now examining the Warsaw proposals, react to such major disruptive actions? If it is stated that, with regard to disarmament, deeds now have to follow words, we have to agree to it. However, goodwill and efforts are required on both sides.

HUNGARY

Spokesman on Troop Withdrawal, Arms Reduction

LD2207224088 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 22 Jul 88

[Gyorgy Bernath report on press conference with Foreign Ministry spokesman Istvan Komoroczki; in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 July—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bernath] The Foreign Ministry spokesman replied to journalists' questions. The NEPSZABADSAG correspondent asked what was the basis for the information in the Western press that a unilateral Soviet troop reduction was expected, and that the arena of this would be Hungary.

[Begin Komoroczki recording] Before the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session, a responsible political leader said that in the "Panorama" television program on the disarmament endeavors which concern Central Europe and our country. He also emphasized, and we subsequently reaffirm, that the dismantling of weapons, in which our country wishes to participate, is mutual; it can be part of a process launched by both sides. In the framework of the European security and confidence-building measures, we count on the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries beginning this reduction of arms in parallel. Comrade Grosz also emphasized this when he denied that unilateral disarmament would take place in Hungary. [end recording]

[Bermath] At the spokesman's press conference, several people asked whether the Hungarian-Romanian dispute had been discussed at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference, or whether the mediation of the Warsaw Pact or others had been requested.

[Begin Komoroczki recording] We have emphasized several times, and I would like to say again now that we wish, and intend to, resolve this at bilateral forums, through bilateral dialogue, and we believe that the Warsaw Pact is not an appropriate forum for this. [end recording]

[Bernath] Did the possibility arise during the visit to Budapest and Bucharest?

[Begin Komoroczki recording] Neither we, nor they, asked either Italy or any other country to come forward as a mediator, or to assist in bridging the existing differences of view in this dispute. [end recording]

Supreme Soviet Deputy on Conventional Arms Talks

PM0408131788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Aug 88 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Yuriy Zhukov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Why Are Things Being Held Up? It Is Time To Seriously Tackle the Reduction of 'Conventional' Arms"—boldface as published]

[Text] An interesting conversation with B. Vogel, president of the FRG Bundesrat (land chamber) and prime minister of the Rhineland-Palatinate state, recently took place at the USSR parliamentary group. There was a discussion of the proposals advanced by M. S. Gorbachev aimed at reducing so-called "conventional" arms.

In this connection, the guest was told that for 2 years now the Warsaw Pact states have been awaiting a reply to their proposals on this question, and that the Soviet leadership now proposes holding an all-European summit meeting and discussing how to break the present vicious circle and ensure the transition from words to deeds in the sphere of reducing "conventional" arms.

Our interlocutor showed great interest in these proposals and voiced confidence that the FRG Government will study them with due attention. Still, I asked: "But how are we to understand the report carried by DPA on 13 July that 'the FRG ruling coalition of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Christian Social Union [CSU] has turned down the Soviet proposal to hold an all-European summit conference'?" The agency cited a statement by M. Geiger, foreign policy spokeswoman for the CDU-CSU's Bundestag faction, who, justifying the negative stand on this issue, declared from Bonn that "no one will allow himself to be wrested from the United States," even though the USSR's proposal certainly does not rule out U.S. participation in such a conference.

To this, B. Vogel replied that, of course, every Bundestag deputy, including M. Geiger, has a right to express his own personal opinion. He noted, however, that he was certain this was not the opinion of the government and the ruling FRG party, and that he would like his opinion to be published in PRAVDA along with the DPA report. I now fulfill his request all the more readily because FRG official government spokesman F. Ost and Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher soon expressed themselves in the same spirit as B. Vogel.

I will point out in passing that M. Geiger also soon radically altered her own viewpoint. When a correspondent for the Deutschlandfunk radio station a few days later asked her whether she supported M. S. Gorbachev's idea of holding an all-European summit meeting, she replied: "Yes, that can be supported, and we very much like certain details of the proposal. It is necessary to discuss how this idea, which is important to us, can be implemented."

This episode might not have merited attention if not for a characteristic and, I would say, typical circumstance: It showed that the old reflex action still has not, unfortunately, been overcome in Western political circles—news agencies hardly have time to report new proposals from socialist countries before the usual stereotype comes into play: You must straightforwardly say "no" or express doubt. And only then can you start investigating the essence of the matter.

I will remind you that M. Geiger was not alone. As early as 14 July, THE WASHINGTON POST carried a report that NATO Headquarters had turned down the "new Soviet proposal advanced in Warsaw." At almost the same time, as the newspaper SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG wrote on 16 July, a White House spokesman ventured to call the idea of convening an all-European summit conference a "fraudulent maneuver."

But during those same days broad circles of the Western public actively supported the new ideas advanced by the USSR, which were made the basis of the action program drawn up by the Warsaw Pact countries' Political Consultative Committee. The leaders of a number of West European states unambiguously declared their desire to familiarize themselves in depth with that program, which, in their opinion, is of considerable interest. Then Washington and the NATO headquarters moderated their usual deliberate skepticism and started saying that the Warsaw Pact states' statement about talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe must be "studied very closely," as an official spokesman for NATO's international secretariat finally said on 18 July.

Today, probably no one objects any longer to this detailed action program. It is a good thing to study any proposal. But this is the question: How long do our partners intend to spend doing this?

I will remind you that for more than 1 year now—since February 1987—a dialogue has been under way in Vienna within the framework of the meeting of the 35 participant states in the all-European conference between representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries "on the subject and purpose" of future talks on reducing "conventional" arms. As long ago as 23 June, R. Ridgway, assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, declared in the House of Representatives that "agreement has already been reached on two-thirds of the provisions of the mandate for future talks on reducing conventional arms." It was said in Vienna that the mandate would finally be drawn up in July and that the talks would begin in October.

But July is already over, and there is still no end in sight to the talking in Vienna. What is holding things up? As R. Ridgway frankly said in the same statement, "the wording of the mandate has still not been finalized owing to differences of opinion that exist not only between the sides but also within our bloc." That is the crux of the matter!

Washington is plainly displeased that its West European allies, who are tired of the arms race and tension, are increasingly openly advocating adopting the new thinking.

When on 14 July R. Ridgway again had to address the House of Representatives in connection with a discussion of the new Soviet proposals, she bluntly said: "Frankly speaking, we are getting serious misgivings about certain elements of the stand of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Federal Republic in the security sphere. We find it hard to understand how, for example, their proposals on the immediate cessation of nuclear tests, on zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in central Europe, and on the rejection of first use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe—how these proposals fit in with the NATO strategy, which consists of forward defense, flexible response, and nuclear deterrence.... Such ideas sow confusion."

I recently talked with a prominent diplomat from a major NATO country. He showed keen interest in the decisions adopted by the Political Consultative Commission. We spoke of the problems of the "common European home," of how it is necessary to develop economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation and humanitarian ties among all countries, and how important it is for the general well-being to reach agreement as quickly as possible on ending the arms race.

When, in this connection, my interlocutor also touched on the question of reducing "conventional" arms, I remarked that the word "conventional" should now be placed in quotation marks because the destructive impact of the present technically sophisticated kinds of non-nuclear weapons is now only a little less than the effect of nuclear weapons. Therefore, concern for mankind's survival demands that the cardinal reduction of not only nuclear but also "conventional," as they are called in the old way, types of weapons be accelerated.

My interlocutor agreed with this, but pessimistic notes were also to be heard in his views.

"You see," he said, "all your Warsaw Pact countries act jointly. We do not know whether there are differences or disagreements among you. In our case the agreement on common positions takes place in full view of everyone, and therefore it is a very complex matter. When you hold bilateral talks with the Americans, everything there is clear and simple: Only two sides are in evidence. But when multilateral talks begin, everything becomes complicated—there are as many positions as participants. Therefore, talks on conventional arms will be complex and lengthy."

I would like to think, however, that the Western diplomat's somber forecast will not come true. It is no coincidence that even FRG Defense Minister R. Scholz, who sought "ex officio," as it were, to campaign for a strengthening of arms, deemed it necessary to declare in

an article carried in the newspaper DIE WELT: "The reduction of conventional arms is the next and chief task for Europe." In this connection, he advocated the NATO allies' speediest elaboration of a general concept of disarmament and mutual security.

Of course, the formulation of this NATO "general concept" is an important and necessary matter for the members of that bloc. But, as FRG Foreign Ministry spokesman J. Chrobog specified, "the NATO countries' formulation of a joint concept with regard to disarmament problems is not, in the opinion of the FRG Government, an obligatory precondition for the start of talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe."

NATO Secretary General M. Woerner expressed himself in the same spirit on 26 July.

This stand should, of course, be welcomed since a further delay over starting the talks would be dangerous. This is because as talk about this matter proceeds, the heavy flywheel of the arms race is continuing to turn. In the FRG itself, whose government publicly advocates accelerating an accord on reducing "conventional" arms, it is now planned to increase defense spending by almost DM2 billion.

The Soviet proposal to hold a "second Reykjavik"—an all-European summit meeting with, of course, the participation of the United States and Canada—which is actively supported by many governments, is acquiring all the more significance. As Norwegian Defense Minister J. J. Holst rightly pointed out on 12 July in support of this idea, "it is very important that the talks on arms control be conducted not only by experts. The main political areas must be discussed and determined at a higher level. It is also necessary to hold such a forum to achieve progress at the talks, to begin the process of reducing conventional arms, and to promote its successful implementation."

The sooner this forum is held, the greater the chances of real disarmament will be.

8 More Missiles Destroyed in Saryozek LD0208200788 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT 2 Aug 88

[Text] Alma-Ata August 2 TASS—A powerful explosion roared at Saryozek, Kazakhstan, once again today. Another eight shorter-range missiles were destroyed under the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The first four missiles were eliminated here yesterday. A total of 1,268 missiles will be exploded in Saryozek.

Oryol, first deputy chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, handed over special certificates to representatives of international and national anti-war organisations, Soviet and foreign journalists who arrived in

Saryozek. They certify their participation in the first action of real disarmament—the destruction of missiles under the Soviet-U.S. treaty.

On the day of the explosion in Saryozek public inspectors of disarmament from various countries took part in an anti-war meeting in the city of Taldy-Kurgan located not far from the missile base. Speakers at the meeting emphasized the importance of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty and drew attention to the need for the people of the two countries and the whole of mankind to break out of the vicious circle of enmity and confrontation.

Negotiator Palenikh on Nuclear Test Ban Talks
LD0408151188 Moscow TASS in English
1456 GMT 4 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—"The Soviet Union favours the earliest complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests," said Igor Palenikh, head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-U.S. full-scale talks on limiting and terminating nuclear tests, held in Geneva. He spoke at a briefing held today at the Press Centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Speaking about the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, to be observed on August 5, he took note of its great significance both for curbing the development of nuclear arms and the arms race and for protecting the environment. At the same time the Soviet spokesman stressed that the question of banning underground nuclear tests had not been solved yet.

Igor Palenikh said that the issue currently on the agenda is a coordinate verification measure which would make it possible to ratify the 1974 Soviet-American explosions treaty. To ensure the ratification of those documents, the Soviet Union had agreed with the USA on holding a joint experiment on verifying nuclear tests.

"We hope that the experiment will produce mutually acceptable solutions, bearing on the verification of the above-mentioned Soviet-American treaties and on further agreements in this field," the Soviet expert said. "As we see them, the bilateral stage-by-stage talks are only one, although important, tool of tackling the problem of nuclear tests prohibition. At any moment the Soviet Union is ready to return to the moratorium on nuclear tests on a mutual basis."

Chernyshev on Ratification of Nuclear Treaties
LD0408203688 Moscow TASS in English
2015 GMT 4 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (the Treaty of

Moscow) was signed by representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in Moscow August 5, 1963.

Now that 25 years have passed since that date and the USSR and the United States are conducting full-scale talks on limitation and, in the long run, termination of nuclear testing, it would be useful to look back and take into consideration the lessons connected with working out and signing of the treaty of 1963.

The U.S. Administration, essentially, then started realizing the fact that a total nuclear war is senseless. Speaking in the American University in Washington on June 10, 1963 John Kennedy emphasized the provision that the USSR and the United States, alongside considerable differences, also have common important and intransient interests which create an objective basis for diplomatic settlement and maintenance of peaceful relations.

By all indications, the President and his associates viewed the Moscow Treaty on nuclear weapon tests not just as a separate important agreement on continuing the nuclear arms race and getting rid of radioactive fallout but also as a starting point for further measures toward the easing of international tension.

At the same time another lesson connected with the passage of this document in the U.S. Senate deserves to be mentioned. Alongside protecting the treaty as a step to peace, representatives of the administration were glorifying it as a means of preserving the military advantages of the United States. It was asserted, specifically, that by restricting nuclear testing to the tests staged underground, where the explosions are more complicated and costlier, and where the United States has more experience, Washington would allegedly be able to hamper Soviet progress and extend the period of technological supremacy of the United States. It was said that the treaty is a result of the United States strength.

This can serve as an evidence how much the U.S. Administration then relied on the U.S. military might, on the hopes of preserving preponderance of the United States over the Soviet Union.

It should be admitted that the USSR's military-political leadership then failed to rise to the occasion. The USSR's negative attitude to on-site inspections was one of the reasons used by definite circles in the West for placing barriers in the way of comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Specifically, the two "threshold" treaties, concluded in 1974 and 1976, have not been ratified.

A qualitatively new situation has formed now largely due to the fact that we have abandoned the previous dogmata and stereotypes. The USSR, specifically, for the sake of achieving the aims of disarmament earlier, expressed the

readiness for priority development of measures of control. Thus it is recorded in the joint Soviet-American statement on the beginning of the talks on nuclear testing that during the talks the sides will agree upon effective measures of verification as an initial step to make it possible to ratify the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty) and will embark upon agreeing on further intermediate restrictions on nuclear testing on the way to the final goal, complete termination of nuclear testing as part of effective process of disarmament.

Soviet Inspectors Arrive in Florida
LD0408060388 Moscow TASS in English
0554 GMT 4 Aug 88

[Text] New York August 4 TASS—A team of ten Soviet inspectors arrived at the U.S. Patrick Air Force Base in Cape Canaveral, Florida. Under the treaty on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles they will

inspect the site where tests of Pershing-2 missiles, subject to destruction under the agreement, were held.

"We are confident that the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty extends the possibilities of peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, helps strengthen security and build up trust between our two countries," the head of the team of Soviet inspectors said upon arrival at the base. "We hope that mutual inspections will become a contribution toward attaining this goal."

Welcoming Soviet specialists, Lieutenant-Colonel Dirk Wykoff, a representative of the base, stressed that such inspections would undoubtedly help establish greater mutual understanding between the USSR and the United States.

The Soviet inspectors will spend 32 hours at the Patrick base. During the stay at the facility they will perform an inspection of a missile launching complex and two shops in which Pershings were assembled until recently.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

German Analysis of Recent Soviet Statements on Defense Sufficiency

18260006 Bonn *TRUPPENPRAXIS* in German
Jun 88 pp 246-251

[Article by Dr Wulf Lapins: "The Russians Are Coming—Or Are They? Perestroika Gets Security Policy Debate Under Way in East European Countries. Does This Mark the Beginning of the End for Forward Defense?"]

[Text] Most West German assessments of Soviet policy conclude that a Soviet threat exists. There are three aspects to this threat image: communist ideology, power and expansion policy and military strength. Generally speaking, the most voluminous studies deal with the third of the three factors. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that these analyses culminate in the finding that "the Russians are coming."

The Russians are coming has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy: the Russians are indeed coming or have been coming since Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power bearing offers of disarmament and not in order to plunge Europe into war. At times, what they say sounds just as frightening. Without a doubt, there are many people who view the Soviets' "new thinking" as a threat, since it destabilizes well-worn patterns of thought and enemy images in their minds.

Perestroyka or restructuring and glasnost or openness/public relations are the hallmarks of Soviet new thinking and as such are keywords which have raised hopes in East and West. The Russian novelist, Daniel Granin, recently came up with a sophisticated description of the new openness, i.e., glasnost means that the "cork is out of the bottle but that its contents are not yet in the glass." But even that much appears to be excessive to Gorbachev's conservative opponents in the USSR. They are no doubt aware of the fact that it would be extremely difficult to put the cork back on the bottle and that the contents would surely be drunk once they really are in the glass. According to Anatoliy Krasikov, the deputy director of the official Soviet news agency TASS, some members of the military establishment are also opposed to the reform policies of perestroyka. "The old generals," he says, "have gotten used to a way of life which they are unwilling to give up."

Their fear of losing some of their privileges may have something to do with their opposition to the new policies; but it is certainly not the whole story. More likely, their opposition is directed primarily against reorganization and a desire for more glasnost in military matters as such. The implementation of the long-range plans for restructuring the Soviet economy will lead to a reapportionment of material and fiscal resources.

This shift in priorities places limits on the power of the generals for all practical purposes. Resources are allocated differently and the monopoly of the military in providing the party and government leadership with security assessments is no more. Instead, civilian research centers such as the Institute for World Trade and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for American and Canadian Studies (ISKAN) have taken over part of the job. In issue No 12/1987 of ISKAN's influential periodical "SShaA—EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIJA" [USA—Economics, Politics, Ideology], deputy editor in chief A. V. Nikoforov asked that "more news of military-political issues be made available and that the unnatural state of affairs—that foreigners know more about our military affairs and our activities in the field of foreign trade and politics than we—be corrected."

In this context I might also mention the administrative efforts to improve the decision-making process through the establishment of a department for arms control and disarmament in the Soviet foreign ministry. The new department is headed by Victor Karpov.

The asymmetrical cut in nuclear missiles of somewhat more than 2:1 in the Soviet Union's disfavor as stipulated in the INF Treaty was no doubt a blow to the self-image of the Soviet military leaders as was the verification scheme which was without precedent in East-West relations. In an interview, Soviet Chief of Staff Akhromeyev admitted that "a great many aspects of military strength and mutual relations between nations of the modern world will have to be reconsidered." "It was difficult for us to prepare this treaty," he added, "and to take the necessary steps connected with it."

But that is not all. A declaration by the Warsaw Pact organisation on 29 May 1987 stated that the "member states are rigidly complying with the levels necessary for defense against a possible aggression." The goal, the statement went on to say, is "to reduce the Armed Forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where both sides, while maintaining their own defensive capabilities, do not have the means for a surprise attack or for offensive operations as such at their disposal."

Do these statements signal the beginning of the end of the offensive military strategy concept known as forward defense? In other words, is the relationship and the weight assigned to offensive and defensive capabilities and options changing?

The statements by Soviet security policy experts seem to indicate that a fundamental shift in Soviet military thinking is indeed taking shape.

Georgiy Arbatov, the director of ISKAN, has said for example that "the general view in the Soviet Union is that deep Armed Forces cuts are the most promising way of restructuring the Armed Forces in a defensive direction."

Arbatov should know; after all, General Secretary Gorbachev put him in charge of a study group that is to work out an alternative military concept. The process of analysis is definitely bearing fruit already. An article on pages 18-21 of No 27/1987 of NEUE ZEIT (New Times) proves it. The article contains the text of a roundtable discussion initiated by the periodical between four former military leaders who have since joined the IMEMO and ISKAN staffs, i.e., Lt Gen Milshtein, Maj Gens Makarevsky and Noshin, and Rear Adm Astafyev. The discussion is on "reasonable upper limits, unstable parity and international security." Milshtein says it is absolutely necessary "to work out the details of the major aspects of the new military doctrine, i.e., the technical aspect." This includes the readiness of the Soviet Union "to have structures and deployments of Armed Forces in the contact areas which offer the other side (i.e., NATO) a guarantee against surprise attack and rule out offensive operations as such." Makarevsky spells this out in greater detail. "In order to create a non-aggressive, reasonable defense posture, it is necessary at the very least to restructure our own arms potential and to rethink our military and political perceptions."

These statements permit one to draw two conclusions. First, they contain an indirect reference to the fact that the present force structure and deployment does not yet correspond to envisaged security policy goals. Secondly, the prevention of surprise attacks and/or military aggression as such is not viewed as the result of a reduction in Armed Forces and capabilities (as the statement on military doctrine would seem to indicate) but also as a result of changes in structure and deployment. The supplement of the November issue of DAS PARLEMENT contained an article by Prof Andrei Kokoshkin, Arbatov's deputy at ISKAN, on the basic principle underlying the plans for a defensive structure of defense strategies by both sides. Once that stage has been reached, it must be unmistakably clear to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact "that the Warsaw Pact's defensive capabilities exceed NATO's capability to carry out offensive operations and conversely, that NATO defense capability exceeds the offensive potential of the Warsaw Pact forces."

The research team on "stability-oriented security and defense policy" of the Max Planck Society in Starnberg has come up with a somewhat contradictory definition of the above situation in security policy terms, i.e., "mutual defensive superiority."

On page 11 of its 5 February 1988 issue, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG reported that Albrecht von Mueller, the head of the research team, had collaborated with Andrzej Karkoszka of the Polish Institute for International Political Affairs in Warsaw, a respected military expert, on a proposal for conventional arms control which aims at achieving conventional stability.

The proposal speaks of "asymmetrical reductions to equal upper limits" based on "existing imbalances" and of the necessity to redesign military postures in the direction of a "predominance of defense." The two experts have this to say on substantially reducing the capability of ground forces to undertake large-scale offensive operations: both alliances should have a maximum of "10,000 battle tanks" and no more than 500 of these should be deployed on every 10,000 square kilometers. The experts call for analogous arms cuts in major military equipment such as artillery and missile launchers which would also have an impact on force structures and thus on operational concepts.

Cutting the number of fighter bombers and helicopters down to 500 on both sides, would make large-scale aerial combat and the destruction of ground targets impossible. To prevent surprise attacks, "ammunition dumps would have to be located at least 150 km from the border." The two alliances would also stop storing mobile amphibious river-crossing equipment. But Mueller and Karkoszka do not call for cuts in conventional military technology which stabilizes defense capability against attack such as engineer barrier equipment as well as antitank and antiaircraft weapons.

It is also interesting to note that the two military experts agree that a nuclear arsenal "not to exceed 500 warheads" should be maintained in Europe as an "uncertainty factor." In other words, nothing is said about a nuclear-free Europe.

The question of course is how representative and politically significant such views really are. As we said before, civilian experts have now joined the military in the debate about the content and scope of changes in Soviet military doctrine/strategy. We can merely speculate about the degree of influence exercised by those interested in maintaining the status quo and those pushing for reforms. The advisory process on military policy and even more so the decision-making process are both as enigmatic as they have always been. The winds of change in the USSR have yet to affect this state of affairs.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev has authoritatively outlined the framework of the kind of European security structure he wants in a letter to von Mueller. "The forces should also be structured in such a manner," Gorbachev wrote, "that they possess all the means necessary to repel a possible attack but which cannot be used for offensive purposes at the same time."

This view conforms with the statements made by Milshtein, Makarevsky, Noshin and Astafyev. In other words, Eastern military experts are either serving as mouthpieces for the highest party circles of the Soviet Union or as a kind of vanguard whose views are shared by the political leaders.

One central question in Soviet research in this context is when the Rubicon of perestroika in security policy will be crossed. In other words, which of the positions and demands of the scientific community and the political experts can the Soviet reform forces support or not (as yet) support in view of the need not to upset the internal political balance? One possible compromise would be to publicize the views of the experts under the policy of glasnost but not to assign immediate political weight to them.

In fact, Soviet experts have recently come out in print with some rather explosive views on defense policy. A few comments by ISKAN historians Vitaliy Shurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrey Kortunov in their article entitled "Sufficient Defense Capability Or How to Break Out of the Vicious Circle" (in NEW TIMES, No 40/1987, pp 13-15) will show what we mean.

One of the driving forces in the Soviet-American arms race is the Soviet response to actual or perceived U.S. challenges in arms technology by developing and deploying analogous weaponry. This spiral of reciprocal arms buildups obviously runs counter to the stated defense policy maxim of "sufficiency." The abovementioned authors attempt to resolve this dilemma in the following manner: "In order to realize the principle of sufficient defense capability," they write, "special importance must be attached to the asymmetrical response to provocative actions by the other side." Another important element of sufficient defense capability cited by them is that of a "flexible nexus of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral steps toward disarmament."

Chief of Staff Akhromeyev, for one, categorically rejects this plea for unilateral measures. The distinct predominance of political over military considerations finds expression in the analysis of the international power relationship. "Under present conditions, it seems as though the limits on the effective use of military force have been reached in a conflict of the magnitude of the U.S. invasion of Grenada."

The implicit reference to the disproportionality between political gains and military costs or, conversely, between political costs and military gains might also be interpreted as an indirect warning addressed to the Soviet Union itself. The following statement may be interpreted as an appeal to abandon the primary military policy maxim that the Soviet Union ought to be as strong as all of its perceived enemies put together: "One more principle underlying sufficient defense capability at the regional and global level is that one should not attempt to prepare one's forces for the task of withstanding the combined might of all potential adversaries. This is simply an unrealistic approach...The attrition of forces connected with such an approach bars every avenue toward disarmament."

By now, it appears that the debate among military men and the scientific community about mutual "structural non-offensive capability" or "non-offensive defense" has largely shifted from the question of whether to the question of how. Since the defense bureaucracies of the two alliances have thus far reacted very cautiously to such plans (which have not yet progressed beyond the embryonic stage), international forums have been used to air one's own ideas and to exchange views between the two systems. The Pugwash Conference and the World Federation of Scientific Workers are two of the major meeting grounds of this kind. These forums offer advantages to both East and West in that their military men and scientists can attend the meetings as independent experts as it were and raise positions which may even be non-conformist. Still, the statements by decision-makers from the socialist countries have been approved back home, i.e., they are always reflections of at least semi-official viewpoints.

Let us look at one paper each presented at the annual meetings of the above organizations to give an idea of the kinds of theories and concepts being discussed. The first of these, entitled "Balance of Forces, Military Doctrines and Security Alternatives," was presented by Peter Deak, a colonel on the Hungarian general staff at the 37th Pugwash Conference held at Gmunden, Austria between 1 and 6 September 1987. The second, entitled "Towards Non-Offensive Defence Through Unilateral Limited and Reciprocated Reductions: On a Gradualistic Approach to Military Crisis Stability in Central Europe," was presented by Walter Romberg, a mathematician of the GDR Academy of Sciences, at the conference of the World Federation of Scientific Workers held in Varna, Bulgaria between 18 and 21 October 1987.

Speaking on the issue of "alternative defensive doctrines," Deak said that the "standardization of the organization and deployment of territorial and conventional ground forces could impart a defensive quality to military doctrines." This would be the case particularly "if the territorial forces were equipped with more modern defensive weapons." Deak cited Austria, Switzerland and Yugoslavia as examples for the implementation of such a mix.

In his view, "non-provocative defense" would have to include a zone "free of heavy weapons" under all circumstances. "Such zones would include various sectors, i.e., demilitarized enclaves, sectors containing defensive or passive weaponry and sectors containing active reserve units." The defensive weapons zones could not be established in identical fashion on both sides of the border, however, because their actual placement would depend on terrain and geostrategic considerations.

Deak's ideas on confidence building are also worth noting. "Unilateral and multilateral steps should be planned jointly," he argues. "Political and military steps

should be implemented as part of the same process. Both radical and gradual actions should be considered and executed simultaneously, if at all possible."

The final section of Deak's paper include various concrete proposals for transforming military doctrine to defensive concepts.

His first proposal is for "troop cuts, withdrawal and destruction of certain types of weapons (withdrawal of obsolete types), redeployment of forces to rear areas and long-term depot storage of certain military equipment." He places particular emphasis on cuts in "combat units." The withdrawal of entire units, he says, would "reduce combat effectiveness." Since "military power is viewed as a unit" made up of "fighting men and weaponry," this unit would thereby be broken up.

The standard NATO argument holds that the Soviet Union has an advantage over the United States with regard to the delivery of both personnel and materiel to the potential (West) European battlefield and views this as an example of geostrategic asymmetry. The following statement by Col Deak may be interpreted as a suggestion to the effect that this imbalance needs to be redressed. In his view, it is acceptable for the East "that certain supplies of units withdrawn from Europe might continue to be stored there. They would have to be conserved and be stored and decentralized in a controllable manner. There would have to be a separation between ammunition and fuel stockpiles."

Like the Polish military expert Andrzej Karkoszka, Deak also favors a certain spacing arrangement between individual echelons. "Troop and equipment density per square kilometer," says Deak, "as well as the size and scale of stockpiles, the maximum strength of units, etc., should increase gradually from the border all the way back to the echelon depth."

Dr Romberg's paper may well represent the most unique contribution thus far to the Eastern debate on potential military restructuring in the direction of an unequivocal defensive defense concept. In Varna, Romberg presented a first outline of his gradualistic approach for "non-offensive defense in Central Europe." These were some of his proposals:

The USSR informs the U.S. of its intention to withdraw two armored divisions from the GDR to its own territory, i.e., the 12th Guard Armored Division of the Third Assault Army, presently headquartered at Neu-Ruppin and the 25th Armored Division of the 20th Guard Army, headquartered at Vogelsang.

The United States would have to respond to this initiative by repatriating the Third Mechanized Division of the U.S. VII Corps, presently headquartered in Wuerzburg.

Subsequently, the USSR moves the 11th Guard Armored Division of its 1st Guard Armored Army from Dresden-Klotzsche and the 1st Airborne Assault Brigade from Cottbus back to Soviet soil. The United States would respond to this move by withdrawing the 8th Mechanized Division of the U.S. V Corps from its present location in Bad Kreuznach and returning it to U.S. soil. This would provide "the U.S. with two additional divisions for use in its rapid deployment force. The USSR would have taken a calculated risk by withdrawing three modern divisions."

The next step would be for the USSR to enter into negotiations aimed at military restructuring with the United States, Great Britain, FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The armored regiment of the 21st Motorized Rifle Division of the 2d Guard Army, presently headquartered in Perleberg, the armored regiment of the 207th Motorized Rifle Division of the 2d Guard Army, headquartered in Stendal and an armored regiment of the 47th Guard Armored Division of the 3d Assault Army, headquartered in Hillersleben would all be repatriated to the USSR.

From a defense policy point of view this would mean "that the Soviet forces stationed west of the Elbe River along the highly sensitive Berlin-Hanover-Magdeburg line would be restructured along the lines of non-offensive defense concept."

The offensive-capable NATO units along the Magdeburg-Stendal-Wittenberge line which are part of the Bundeswehr's 1st Armored Division, presently headquartered in Hanover and the 3d Armored Division, headquartered in Buxtehude, are to be restricted in their effectiveness in a two-stage process:

They are to be turned into blocking units somewhat similar to the light units of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions.

The 27th Airborne Brigade, headquartered in Lippstadt, is to be disbanded.

The NATO countries and the member states of the Warsaw Pact which have deployed forces in the areas affected by the reductions are to form a joint committee. Its job would be to work out further step-by-step cuts in the forces remaining in these areas and to turn them into non-offensive defense units. In this connection, Romberg calls for the introduction of "light antitank weapons, mortars, limited motorization and a decentralized communications structure."

Following a number of positive experiences with troop reduction and restructuring on the basis of the procedure outlined above, the final step would be the establishment of such a zone between the FRG and the GDR and the FRG and the CSSR.

By contrast, what are the positions taken by the Soviet military establishment? What are their arguments? The following analysis will be limited to statements by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, the chief of the Soviet general staff, contained in his "Doctrine for the Prevention of War, for the Protection of Peace and Socialism" by Army Gen Anatoliy Gribkov, the chief of staff of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact, in his "Doctrine of the Preservation of Peace" and by Army Gen Dmitriy Yasov, the Soviet defense minister, in his "On Steadfastness and Activity of Defense."

According to Akhromeyev, the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact organization is "pervaded by the spirit of new political thinking" as reflected in a corresponding "new approach to defense." The emphasis on "parity and sufficiency" which underlies the new guiding principles for the "solution of the defense mission" may be viewed as a fundamental change of policy in this context. This would mean that the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies were neither quantitatively nor qualitatively adequate to the pursuit of military-strategic goals.

The exclusively defensive nature of the doctrine might not merely be restricted to declamatory statements on military policy but would have to find more specific expression with regard to its military technology aspect. According to Akhromeyev this is already the case. "Specifically with regard to concrete strategic decisions and measures, to the plans for the development of the united forces, to their organizational structure and technical equipment and their practical operational training and combat training...the defense orientation is being implemented," he points out. There are just enough forces "as are appropriate to the nature of the military threat and the actual needs of reliable protection and the maintenance of the security of our countries." That, he notes, is the "meaning of the principle of sufficiency."

On the other hand, the Akhromeyev and Gribkov statements contain polemics against NATO security policy; Yasov's statement does not. "The practical behavior of the NATO forces is becoming more and more dangerous," Akhromeyev says. "The annual exercises and maneuvers in Europe, in the Atlantic and in other strategically important regions are becoming more and more comprehensive and wide-ranging which makes it difficult to distinguish between them and an actual deployment of forces for war. This increases the danger of surprise attack." Gribkov's statement echoes these sentiments.

Statements such as these surely do not reflect the promise of "new thinking," nor do Eastern maneuver assessments in conformance with the CSCE agreements confirm this kind of alarmism. Akhromeyev writes that "the levels necessary to provide for adequate defense must

not be interpreted unilaterally without taking the existing balance of forces into consideration and it would make even less sense to interpret this as unilateral disarmament; a unilateral reduction of our defense efforts."

It is this very balance of forces, he argues, which NATO attempts to alter in its favor by "materially preparing for war, stepping up the arms race and aiming for military superiority over the socialist nations."

In the paper on military doctrine already cited above, the Warsaw Pact's political advisory committee redefined "the parameters for sufficient levels of defense to repel possible aggression," citing the need for forces "in a state of sufficient combat readiness...to inflict a crushing defeat on any aggressor."

The statements by the two chiefs of staff clearly demonstrate the correlation between the security policy determinants for "sufficient defense" and the capability "to inflict a crushing defeat." "Let me emphasize once more," Gribkov says, "that your [i.e., the Warsaw Pact's military organs'] capability is in the nature of response and is based on conditions of constraint. It is far removed from raising forces and equipment to levels in excess of the need to repel a possible aggression." Marshal Akhromeyev stresses the alleged reactive element in defense policy actions even more. "What is sufficient for defense is not determined by us but by the actual activities undertaken by the U.S. and the NATO bloc." Under these circumstances, the Warsaw Pact member nations are "constrained to maintain their forces at such levels as will enable them reliably to repel any aggression."

This raises the question of whether the threatened response would take place on the adversary's soil (i.e., the basis for an offensively oriented forward defense strategy) or whether the term "crushing defeat" is to be understood in the context of defensive forward defense. That would indeed signify a structural change in the strategic-operational determination of the military technology aspect of Soviet military doctrine.

First of all, it should be noted that Soviet articles on military policy begin not to contain references to the prior standard formula of the resolute "destruction of the aggressor on his own soil" at about the same time as General Secretary Gorbachev submitted his initial proposals for disarmament.

Are the military theory contents of Soviet strategic concepts not to minimize the positive reaction of Western public opinion to the Soviet disarmament initiatives? Or is the abandonment of previous formulations a first indication of the abovementioned potential shift in priorities from the military-strategic, i.e., more offensive type of combat to a more clearly defined defensive posture?

The Soviet defense minister's article provides no clear answer to this question although its title would lead one to hope so. Yasov calls for a defense posture that is "steadfast and active," clarifying his meaning by proposing changes in Soviet military defense practices, e.g., the establishment of "deep defense sectors" and "infantry minefields," the creation of an effective "antitank component" and a system of "engineer obstacles." These are types of military technology appropriate to defensive combat operations.

But Yasov also writes that "the most outstanding expression of the activity of defense is to carry out counterattacks and counterstrikes." An "important role" in this context is assigned to "prepared burst fire against nuclear weapon delivery systems, enemy precision weapons and control systems, against his main groupings in concentration areas and against formations and units along march routes and deployment sectors."

These sudden concentrations of fire are to take place "within a short period of time and in great depth with the participation of all ground-based, air-based and, at times, sea-based weapons." The question is, however, whether Yasov is talking about operational actions in the context of operational counterattacks or crushing blows in pursuit of the strategic goal of the subsequent military occupation of enemy territory. FRG defense ministry sources believe the latter to be the case. State Secretary Lothar Ruehl has made that point in lengthy newspaper articles on several occasions, e.g., "An Offensive Overthrow Strategy" in *FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG*, 16 Oct 87 p 12 and "Ever Since Lenin and Trotsky Soviet Strategy Has Been One of Offense and Victory" in *DIE WELT*, 3 Feb 88 p 8.

But as is well known, Western defense concepts also contain strong elements of offensive actions and counterstrikes. This fact was just recently underscored in an article entitled "The Use of Airmobile Forces in Operational Counterattacks" by Col von Kirchbach, a member of the general staff, which appeared in *TRUPPEN-PRAXIS*, No 2/1988 pp 70-77.

"The primary operational purpose of attacks as well as counterattacks is to crush enemy forces and to gain territory," the article says. If the above statement appeared in a Soviet professional journal, it would no doubt be taken by the West as continuing evidence of the unbridled offensive will of the Eastern military coalition. And yet, in this particular case, it is being described as an

effective way of employing NATO air combat units: "The air combat force attacks the enemy units in depth, destroys their artillery and interdicts their supply lines while their armored units are being crushed by mechanized reserves. The operations over the enemy territory are preceded by intensive air reconnaissance."

It is obvious that there is a need to compare the military doctrines and strategies of both sides in order to arrive at a proper assessment of their authentic military operational and command principles.

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Defense Official Against Reducing Armed Forces
AU0308130588 Bonn DIE WELT in German
3 Aug 88 p 1

[Clemens Range report: "Reduction of Armed Forces Would Be A 'Completely Wrong Signal'; State Secretary Wuerzbach Contradicts Vogel's Advance Regarding Bundeswehr Strength"]

[Excerpts] Bonn—Defense State Secretary Peter Kurt Wuerzbach has called SPD Chairman Vogel's proposal to reduce the Bundeswehr peace strength (495,000 men) a "completely wrong signal at the wrong time." In a talk with *DIE WELT*, Wuerzbach said that "whoever takes such a step when there is no need, will not get anything in return." With regard to the planned conventional disarmament negotiations in Europe, he said "this advance is dangerous." For we are still facing "an opponent with a conventional arms buildup who is capable of attacking." A reduction of the Bundeswehr could only be the result of successful disarmament talks in the conventional sector. [passage omitted]

However, the Bundeswehr has pursued the objective of "maintaining security at least at today's level with more modern weapons but fewer soldiers" for years, Hardthoehe [seat of Defense Ministry] spokesman Peter Monte stated to *DIE WELT*. Modernization is a "transmission belt for disarmament." However, the size of the Bundeswehr is not only a national issue but "a concern of alliance policy," Monte said. For example, the personnel measures that became necessary on account of the sudden drop in the birth rate caused by the pill were also discussed in NATO.

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